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Abstract
This paper discusses environmental policy instruments in a differential-game
model of international trade with oligopolistic competition. Strategic interactions
occur if firms use feedback strategies and therefore react on decisions of their com-
petitor. Eventually this harms firm profits, because all firms act strategically.
A firm reacts differently if its competitor is subject to an environmental standard
than if it is subject to an environmental tax. Under open-loop investment strategies
and feedback strategies of energy use, environmental taxes always give rise to more
investment for strategic reasons than standards. This confirms results of multistage
static models of the same problem. The new result is that under feedback investment
strategies the reverse can be the case.
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Flexibility is an important reason to advocate economic environmental policy instruments
like emission taxes. More than under traditional command and control measures, polluters
can choose to what degree and in which way they decrease their pollution. Consequently,
the regulator may reach a high allocative efficiency, even with inadequate information
about the cost structure of the polluting firms.
In case of imperfect competition, however, flexibility has also another effect,
because in such markets commitment plays an important role (see e.g., Tirole, 1988). In
some cases it is advantageous for a firm in oligopoly to be able to ’burn its bridges’. The
ability to bind itself to certain actions gives the firm a relatively strong position towards a
competitor. More flexibility by its nature decreases the possibilities to commit.
The characteristics of government policy influence the flexibility of a firm. If
government policy is implemented by rigid prescriptions, it is a commitment for the firm.
If, on the contrary, the government bases its policy on incentives, firms are more flexibile
so that they have less commitments. Brander and Spencer (1983) analyzed the differences
between trade policies when trade can be characterized as an international oligopoly. If
governments want high profits for their home firms, they may want to provide home firms
with commitment via their trade policy.
In a similar way, environmental policy instruments may affect the international
competitiveness of firms. It was found that environmental standards are unambiguously
’better’ than taxes, in a multistage static model of international rivalry where allocative
efficiency can be neglected (Ulph, 1992). Under standards, firms gain commitment, so
that they earn more profits, while regulators reach the same environmental target.
This paper shows that this conclusion depends on the type of investment strategy
applied by firms. In a multistage static model, investment decisions are taken once and
for all and that is another type of commitment for firms. In order to relax this implicit
assumption, the richer framework of differential games is needed. In that framework, one
can distinguish different types of strategies. In particular, an open-loop decision strategy
means that the firms choose their actions at the beginning of the planning period and stick
to these actions no matter what happens. This implies a relatively large commitment,
similar to the multistage static model. A feedback decision strategy, though, means that
the firms condition their actions on observations on the current state of affairs. This
implies that firms are not committed and can react indirectly on each other’s past actions.
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It will be shown that the result that standards are ’better’ than taxes is ambiguous
and depends on the type of investment strategy applied by the firm. To be more precise, for
open-loop investment strategies the results from multistage modelling are confirmed, but
for feedback investment strategies it is ambiguous whether standards or taxes are ’better’.
Feedback strategies lead to more strategic interaction, which drives the firms to higher
investment with lower profits. Under taxes this effect is mitigated due to the substitution
between energy and capital. That does not occur under standards, because in that case
firms are at a corner solution for their energy use and do not substitute between energy
and capital. Therefore, the use of standards reduces over-investments, which improves
profits, as was found before, but it also increases over-investments, which reduces profits,
since the mitigating effect is absent. The net effect can go both ways.
Section 2 presents international rivalry as a differential game model of two com-
peting firms. Section 3 derives the equilibrium to this model under feedback investment
strategies. A comparison of the equilibrium under taxes and standards gives the main
result of the paper. The economic explanation for this result is provided at the end of this
section. In section 4 we discuss choices of parameter values and how results depend on
these values. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 An international duopoly model
The model describes a duopoly where each competitor is situated in a different country1
and faces the environmental policy of that country. The decision makers are firms and
regulators. The regulator in each country has a fixed environmental target ei(t) for all
times t and prefers high profits for its home firm. Emissions are assumed to have local
effects only. Firms and countries are connected through the common market for outputs.
Each firm is a profit maximizer. Throughout the whole paper perfect foresight is assumed.
Environmental policy consists either of a tax on energy or of a standard on the use
of energy. It is assumed that emissions are directly related to energy use, which implies
that an emission tax or standard is equivalent to an energy tax or standard. The regulator
sets the level of the tax or the standard beforehand. Taxes,  i, are set such that, for all t,
ei(t) = ei(t). The regulator is assumed to have full information on the firm so that it can
accomplish this. Standards are simply equal to ei(t). Under these assumptions, taxes and
1With equal environmental policy instruments in each country, the results also apply to a duopoly in one
country.
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standards result in the same energy use.
Each firm i maximizes its discounted stream of profits
R1
0 e
 rti(t)dt, where r is
a constant rate of discount. Let xi denote domestic and xj foreign output, pe the price of
energy, I i investments and C(I i) costs of investments. Firm i’s profits, i(t), are given
by:
A. In case of a tax
i(t) = Ri(xi(t); xj(t))  (pe(t) +  i(t))ei(t)  C(I i(t)) (1)
B. In case of a standard
i(t) = Ri(xi(t); xj(t))  pe(t)ei(t)  C(I i(t)); (2)
where in this last case ei(t) must be smaller than or equal to ei(t).
It will be assumed that revenues,Ri, are concave in outputs and furthermore satisfy:
@2Ri
@xi@xj
< 0, and @R
i
@xj
< 0. Output is a function of the two production factors energy and
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> 0. The last condition
means that more capital increases the marginal productivity of energy. Firms must decide
on outputs and investments or, which is equivalent, on energy use and investments.
The costs of investment, C(I i), include adjustment costs and acquisition costs.
The cost function is assumed to be increasing and convex: C 0(I i) > 0, C 00(I i) > 0. Zero
investment involves no costs: C(0) = 0. Investments add to the capital stock according
to the standard equation for capital accumulation:
_K i(t) = I i(t)  diK i(t); (3)
where di is the constant rate of depreciation. Summarizing, the duopoly is modelled as
the following differential game.





e rtfRi(xi(t); xj(t))  (pe(t) +  i(t))ei(t)  C(I i(t))gdt (4)
s.t. _K i(t) = I i(t)  diK i(t) (5)
ei(t), I i(t)  0 i = 1; 2: (6)
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e rtfRi(xi(t); xj(t))  pe(t)ei(t)  C(I i(t))gdt (7)
s.t. _K i(t) = I i(t)  diK i(t) (8)
ei(t)  ei(t) (9)
ei(t), I i(t)  0 i = 1; 2: (10)
C. In case of a standard in country i and a tax in country j the differential game is a
combination of A and B.
3 Equilibrium and economic interpretation
3.1 Equilibrium strategies of energy use
Since energy use does not appear in the system dynamics, choices of a certain level of
energy have no effect on future periods. Therefore it is possible to solve for the ei at each
time separately as a function of K i, Kj ,  i and  j (or ei and ej ). Assuming that each firm
takes the energy input of the other firm as given, the first order conditions for an optimal
choice of e1 and e2 can be formulated. These are the usual equilibrium conditions on
marginal benefits and marginal costs.





=  i + pe; i = 1; 2: (11)












  pe)(ei   ei) = 0; i = 1; 2: (14)
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C. In case of a standard in country i and a tax in country j, for country i equations (12)
to (14) must be satisfied while for country j equation (11) applies.
These conditions result in Nash equilibrium levels of energy use, eiN(K i;Kj). It is
assumed that in equilibrium both firms are in the market. From (11) or (12) it follows that
in the equilibrium @R
i
@xi
> 0. This is reasonable since it is never optimal for a firm to have
an output where marginal revenues are negative.
If the two firms cooperate to maximize joint profits, the first order conditions for










=  i + pe; i = 1; 2 (15)
which is a modification of (11). In this case effects on foreign profits are included in the
marginal benefits. In case of standards, first order conditions are a similar modification of
(12) to (14). The resulting optimal levels of energy use are denoted by eiC(K i;Kj).
3.2 Equilibrium strategies of investment
In this model, firms are in a dynamic environment where they have to make decisions over
a longer period of time. Different strategies can be distinguished. If firms apply so called
open-loop strategies, they do not react on current state variables. Open-loop investment
strategies are a function of time only, I iOL(t). If players apply so called Markov feedback
strategies, they react indirectly to each other’s past decisions, as far as these are reflected
in the current value of the state variables (K1 andK2). Therefore, each firm must take into
account how its decisions will influence the state of the system and hence future decisions
of the competitor. Feedback investment strategies will be functions of the capital stocks,
I iFB(K1;K2).
It is not clear ex ante how firms will react to a higher competing capital stock,
i.e. whether the derivative @I
iFB
@Kj
is positive or negative. The effect of the competitor’s
capital stock on investment can be negative for the reason that a higher capital stock
of the competitor implies that the competitor produces more output. This decreases
the profitability of output and investment to the home firm. The effect can be positive,
though, for the reason that a higher competing capital stock induces the firm to increase
its investments to keep its market share.
The equilibrium under environmental taxes and standards with open-loop invest-
ment strategies was analyzed in Feenstra, Kort, Verheyen and De Zeeuw (1996). To
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compute an equilibrium of feedback strategies for the general formulation of the differen-
tial game in section 2 is difficult. But it is possible to approximate the steady-state capital
stock in the feedback equilibrium for explicit functional forms. Therefore consider the
following scenario:
Prices of output follow from market equilibrium on a world market with a linear inverse
demand curve, p = p0   xi   axj . The parameter a, 0  a  1, denotes the
degree of substitutability between the products. Gross revenues, Ri, are given by
Ri = pxi = p0x
i   (xi)2   axixj.




Investment costs are quadratic, C(I i) = 1
2
c(I i)2.
Furthermore, it is assumed that the two countries are symmetric, that is, they are assumed
to have equal rates of depreciation and discount, d and r, equal production functions
and the same targets of environmental policy, e. The technology is increasing returns to
scale, so that  > 1
2
. Marginal productivity of capital is decreasing, so that  < 1. It
is straightforward to check that these functional forms satisfy the assumptions made in
section 2.
With these functional forms the expression for the Nash equilibrium value of
energy use in section 3.1 in case of taxes in both countries becomes:
eiN(K i;Kj) =
p20K
i2(2(pe +  j) + (2  a)Kj2)2
(4(pe +  i +K i2)(pe +  j +Kj2)  a2K i2Kj2)2
: (16)






s.t. _K i = I i   dK i (18)
_Kj = Ij   dKj (19)




i2(2(pe +  j) + (2   a)Kj2)2(pe +  i +K i2)







In case of standards in both countries, ei = ei and
i(K i;Kj) = p0
p
eiK i












The derivative of marginal profits to foreign capital, iij , is negative for both policy
instruments and for all values of capital and energy use. The derivative of marginal profits
to own capital, iii, is assumed to be negative. For standards, this requires p0 to be large
enough, for taxes it requires an upper limit on (pe +  ). It can be derived that the second-
order derivative of profits to foreign capital, ijj , is always positive under standards. Under
taxes, ijj > 0 requires again that (p
e+  ) is not too large. In the sequel it is assumed that
this is the case.
These objective functions are approximated with revenue functions that are linear-
quadratic in (K i;Kj). This gives an approximation to the feedback steady-state solution.
The approximation is found by application of the following algorithm:
step 1) Choose a starting point, (K0;K0).
step 2) Compute a second-order Taylor approximation of the objective function in the
neighbourhood of this starting point.
step 3) Determine the steady-state capital stocks for this approximation analytically.
step 4) Take the resulting steady state as the new starting point and return to step 2.
Repeat the algorithm until the new steady state is close enough to the old one.
When convergence occurs, this is at a point (K;K), which is the steady-state capital
stock for the Taylor approximation of the objective function around the same point,
(K;K). In appendix A, step 2 and 3 of this algorithm are elaborated.
With the above algorithm, we can compute equilibrium linear investment strategies,
I(K i;Kj) = P1K
i + P3K
j + P4, and steady-state capital stocks, K , under taxes and
standards, for a target of environmental policy, e. These strategies are approximations to
the feedback equilibrium strategies in a small neighbourhood of (K;K).
The sign of P3 is interesting, because it determines the type of strategic interaction
in case of feedback investment strategies. If P3 > 0 a firm reacts to a higher capital
stock of its competitor with higher investments. If P3 < 0 the reverse is the case. The
following proposition shows that the only possibly stable solution has a negative P3 under
a condition on the second order derivatives of (21), respectively (22). Furthermore a
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sufficient condition for this solution to be stable is given. The conditions can be shown to
hold for reasonable values of the parameters both for taxes and for standards. The proof






(2d+ r)2c+ 2iij  iii (23)









then this solution is indeed stable.
In other words, under the conditions of the proposition, a unique stable feedback
equilibrium steady-state capital stock, (K;K), exists for the approximated objective
function and the corresponding equilibrium investment strategy has P3 < 0. Under taxes,
for all , both conditions in the proposition are satisfied, given the parameter values used.
Under standards, the conditions in the proposition are satisfied for most parameter values.
However, it may happen that ijj >
1
4
(2d+ r)2c+2iij  iii. In that case, multiple stable
equilibria may exist and there is a coordination problem on the choice of equilibrium
strategies. For  and e low enough, however, one can exclude this case (see appendix C).




= P3, is negative around the steady state, for reasonable parameter values.
Given the decreasing marginal productivity of capital it is to be expected that the
derivative of investment with respect to own capital, @I
iFB
@Ki
= P1, is negative. This is
indeed true for realistic values of d, r and c, which is formally derived in appendix D. For
-unreasonably- large values of the parameters mentioned, it is possible to find a positive
P1, due to indirect effects of capital on equilibrium emissions.
Taxes and standards are to be compared in the feedback equilibrium steady state.
Figure 1 shows steady-state capital stocks and firm profits for both policy instruments as a
function of the environmental target. Before-tax profits are also shown, to enable a good
comparison of taxes and standards. Of course, after-tax profits are always substantially
lowered by the tax-payment. Since compensation is possible, it is better to compare
before-tax profits with profits under standards.
9
figure 1: Capital stocks and profits as a function of the environmental target.
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- - - - : standards
____ : before-tax profits
- . - . : after-tax profits
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Remember that in this model, due to rivalry between firms, investment is too high,
so that profits are lower, the higher the capital stock. It is clearly not true that taxes
always result in higher capital stocks than standards. On the contrary, for most parameter
values, standards result in higher capital stocks. That is due to the investments that are
carried out for strategic reasons. As a consequence profits are larger under taxes for
most parameter values, even when after-tax profits are considered. The value of  is an
important parameter in this respect, as well as the stringency of environmental policy. The
laxer environmental policy, the more likely it is that standards result in higher steady-state
capital stocks and lower profits than taxes2.
3.3 Strategic effects
To explain the effect of strategic behaviour on investment under environmental policy,
we use so called Net Present Value expressions. These expressions can be derived from
forward integration of first-order conditions. They give the properly discounted future
stream of extra profits due to an additional unit of capital at time t (See e.g., Hartl and
Kort, 1996).
First, consider the cooperative solution. From the point of view of the two firms







_K i = I i   dK i; for i = 1; 2 (26)
with ei = eiC . From the first-order conditions the following Net Present Value expression













]ds  C 0(I i(t)) = 0 (27)
The term in brackets gives the extra revenues at time s due to an additional unit of capital
stock, invested at time t. Future revenues are discounted with rate r and corrected for
depreciation at rate d, since one unit of capital bought at time t reduces in value to
e(r d)(s t) units at time s. To obtain this unit, the firm must spendC 0(I i)) at time t. In case
2Provided that a unique stable equilibrium exists.
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of cooperation, the -negative- effect of increased home capital on earnings of the foreign
firm is taken into account. All strategic interaction is absent, since the firms cooperate.
Second, consider equilibria where the firms compete in a Cournot-Nash fashion.
The Net Present Value expression for firms that choose investments according to an















]ds  C 0(I i(t)) = 0 (28)







, due to strategic interaction. Firms
try to influence energy and, hence, output decisions of their competitor with their capital









< 0, when taxes are applied as an instrument of environmental policy, this
strategic effect leads to more investment. In case of environmental standards, however,
@ej
@Ki
= 0 because firms are on the boundary of a binding constraint. In that case the
strategic effect is absent and investments are lower.
Finally consider the Net Present Value expression when firms use feedback in-
vestment strategies. This requires first-order conditions for an equilibrium, which can for
instance be found in Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, p536). In our model this leads to:
C 0(I i) = ii (29)
































Here ii denotes the shadow value of own capital to firm i. Its value is determined by
condition (30). This includes the term ij @I
j
@Ki
because of feedback reactions. The variable
ij denotes the shadow value of foreign capital to firm i. Condition (31) determines
its value. Note that these first-order conditions are not sufficient to actually compute

























]ds  C 0(I i(t)) = 0 (32)























In case of standards in both countries, both firms are at a corner solution for energy use.











]ds  C 0(I i(t)) = 0 (34)



















. This effect can be strong enough to outweigh the first strategic effect. From a
















for all t, the strategic incentive for
investment is greater under standards than under taxes.
The term ij @I
j
@Ki
captures the indirect strategic effect. If firm i increases its in-




. The shadow price ij denotes the valuation by firm i of such a change
in firm j’s investment. Thus ij gives the valuation by firm i of an additional amount
of capital owned by firm j. This is given by the properly discounted flow of marginal
decreases in firm i’s revenues if firm j owns an extra amount of capital (cf. (33) and
(35)). Since firm i’s revenues decrease when competition from firm j increases, ij will
have a negative sign. If the derivative of Ij to K i is negative, which we have shown to be
the case for reasonable parameter values (cf. proposition 1), then the additional strategic
effect is positive. This effect, ij @I
j
@Ki
, can be higher for standards than for taxes, since
firms are less flexible in case of binding standards and do not substitute energy for capital.




marginal increase in capital K i leads firm j to invest less and hence to decrease its capital
stock, Kj . This in turn leads firm j to decrease its output. It depends on the sign of @e
j
@Kj
whether j’s use of energy also decreases. If substitution effects dominate, ej increases.
In case of standards, substitution between production factors - i.e. an increase in ej in
reaction to a decrease in Kj - will not occur, since the standard is an upper bound to ej .




equals zero. In case of taxes, on the contrary, the firm is flexible to adjust
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its use of energy in an optimal way to the capital stocks. Substitution between energy
and capital then partly cancels the effect on output of an increased capital stock. That




can be greater with standards than with taxes, provided substitution effects dominate
marginal-productivity effects.
The proposition contradicts earlier conclusions by Ulph (1992). He derived that
standards always result in less strategic investments than taxes. Ulph used a multistage
static model. That implied that his subgame-perfect equilibrium is equivalent to an equi-
librium with feedback strategies for energy use, but open-loop strategies for investment,
as represented by the Net Present Value expression (28). His model does not allow for
strategic interaction between firms in investment strategies. Only then the result holds
that taxes always provide larger incentives for investment than standards.
To conclude, it is not generally true that standards moderate strategic overinvest-
ment when firms react on each others behaviour by adjustments in their investment plans.
Although standards commit firms to a certain use of energy input, they may drive firms to
more investment than taxes. In that case the use of standards as a commitment device does
not work. Then, the use of taxes as an environmental policy instrument is to be preferred
when, next to environmental targets, profits of domestic firms are an important objective
to the government.
4 Comparative statics for parameter values
Figure 1 shows that standards may result in more strategic investment than taxes. As
a consequence, firm profits are higher under taxes than under standards. For some
strict environmental policy targets the reverse is true, however. This section discusses
the values chosen for the parameters that may influence this result. We show some
comparative static results that indicate how the difference between taxes and standards
changes with parameter values. The relationship between the parameters of the model
and the steady-state values of the capital stock in the feedback solution is complex. It
involves the approximation algorithm and the computation of the roots of a third degree
polynomial in the third step of this approximation algorithm. Therefore we can not give
simple expressions that link parameter values to the conditions in the propositions. But
numerical experimentation gives some clues about the direction of changes.
First consider the parameter  in the production function. The literature on
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econometric production functions provides empirical estimates of returns to scale in
large energy-intensive industries. These gave a range around 1.2 (Morrison, 1993, 1994,
Ilmakunnas and Törmä, 1994, Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983). To satisfy the model
assumptions, 1
2
<  < 1 must hold. Given that the Cobb-Douglas coefficient of energy
equals 1
2
, returns to scale then vary between 1 and 1.5. Compared to 1.2, this seems
reasonable given the empirical literature.
Now consider the price of energy, pe. When prices are extremely high, they provide
enough incentives for firms to reduce energy use and environmental policy is superfluous.
Therefore, we took the relatively low value 1 for this price.
figure 2: Emissions for no policy case, as a function of .
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Figure 2 depicts emissions, when no environmental policy is applied and pe has the
value 1. It shows that for values of  close to 1, even with this low value for pe, the
range of meaningful emission goals is limited. When  is high, energy is a relatively
unimportant production factor, and for lax environmental policy goals, environmental
policy is unnecessary. The higher the price of energy, pe, the more important this effect is.
For d, the rate of depreciation, we took the value 0.10. For r, the rate of discount
we took the value 0.08. Figure 3 shows the effect of different values for d. If d is
higher, capital depreciates faster. That implies that commitment with regard to future
output provided by an additional unit of capital decreases. The consequence is a lower
steady-state capital stock and a smaller difference between standards and taxes. For d high
15
enough, the difference changes sign, because strategic interaction through commitment
on energy use dominates strategic interaction through commitment on investments. Then
taxes result in more strategic investment than standards. Increases in r have a similar
effect. A higher rate of discount implies that the future is less important relative to the
present. Current costs of investment then become important relative to future earnings.
The steady-state capital stock hence decreases. The dynamic aspects that cause a difference
between environmental policy instruments in strategic interaction through commitment
on investment loose importance. As a result, the difference between standards and taxes
decreases and eventually changes sign, when the static aspect of strategic interaction
through commitment on energy use dominates.
figure 3: Effect on capital stock and profits of changes in d.
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For c, that is a parameter for adjustment costs of investment, we took the value 2.
The higher c, the higher the costs of investment, and the lower therefore the steady-state
stock of capital. Changes in capital stock become more expensive, so that commitment
through investment is less attractive. Therefore the differences between standards and
taxes decrease with c.
The parameter a, finally, denotes the interconnectedness of markets. If a = 0, firms
do not influence each others prices. In that case both firms are monopolists and strategic
effects disappear. Environmental taxes and standards then have equal effects on firms
in the model above. The higher a, the more effect firms have on each others prices and
the more important strategic effects become. For a = 1 the outputs of the two firms are
perfect substitutes. Figure 4 shows equilibrium capital stocks and profit rates for different
values of a. The difference between standards and taxes increases with a, because strate-
gic effects gain in importance. For that reason we took a to be equal to 1 in the other figures.
17
figure 4: Effect on capital stock and profits of changes in a.
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- - - - : standards
____ : before-tax profits
- . - . : after-tax profits
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The results in this section show again that it is not true that taxes always result in more
investment than standards for strategic reasons, and therefore lower profit rates. The
reverse, that standards lead to more investment and lower profits is neither valid. Which
environmental policy instrument is ’better’, which means here that it results in the highest
profits for a given emission target, depends on the precise values of the parameters.
5 Conclusions
This paper is concerned with international rivalry and environmental policy. In a multistage
static framework Ulph (1992) found that environmental taxes lead to higher investment
than standards. Firms that compete on an international market have an incentive to
increase investments to gain strategic advantage. But in equilibrium, competitors act
similar so that higher capital stocks, more output and lower profits result. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, governments prefer standards rather than taxes, due to the reduction in
strategic investment. This was confirmed in Feenstra, Kort, Verheyen and De Zeeuw
(1996), in a differential-game framework with open-loop investment strategies. The
differences between environmental taxes and standards as regards their effect on strategic
behaviour are due to their influence on the flexibility of firms. Standards reduce a firm’s
flexibility in its choice of emissions, while taxes do not.
In this paper, flexibility in investment behaviour is introduced. More specifically,
we consider feedback investment strategies. Under feedback investment strategies, firms
have to take into account that the competitor will react through its investment on marginal
increases in the capital stock. The effects of environmental standards and taxes on this
type of strategic behaviour differ. It turns out that it cannot -as in the case of open-
loop investment strategies- be stated that taxes will always lead to more investments than
standards. It is shown in the paper that if substitution effects between production factors
are large enough, investment is larger under standards than under taxes. Ceteris paribus,
governments then prefer taxes rather than standards as environmental policy instrument.
Note that in the current model, consumer surpluses are neglected. It is implicitly
assumed that firms sell a substantial part of their output to third countries. Ulph (1996)
and Kennedy (1994) include consumer surplus in a multistage static game. Since it is in
the interest of consumers that competition between the two firms results in more output,
they favour larger investments. Inclusion of consumer surplus would therefore require a
19
different valuation of high capital stocks. When consumer surplus is important, taxes may
be preferred by the government over standards, while still taxes lead to more investment
than standards.
A differential game model of a duopoly describes the behaviour of firms that
compete in an international market. After equilibrium behaviour on energy choice has
been inserted, a capital accumulation game results. The two firms choose investment
rates, to maximize their objectives, given government policy and the strategy of the
competitor. Feedback equilibria in capital accumulation games are derived in Reynolds
(1987) and in Fershtman and de Zeeuw (1992). The game in this paper is a bit different,
because investment has indirect effects on output through energy use. That implies that the
objective function is not linear quadratic in capital stocks like in the two papers mentioned
above. But it is possible with the help of an approximation algorithm to extend the method
employed in Fershtman and de Zeeuw and find approximations to the steady state.
The indirect effects through energy choices and the approximation step imply that
equilibrium investment depends in a complex way on domestic and foreign capital stocks.
In particular, the sign of the derivative of equilibrium investment to foreign capital may be
either negative or positive. Conditions are given for stable equilibria that are characterized
by a negative sign of this derivative. Although these conditions capture the cases that are
economically most relevant, an exceptional case with a positive derivative is still possible.
Flaherty (1980) analyzes a capital accumulation game with symmetric and asym-
metric equilibria. With the help of linear approximations, it is shown that the asymmetric
equilibria are stable and the symmetric equilibrium is not. Although in a different context,
this shows that stable asymmetric equilibria are certainly an option in this type of models.
For tractability reasons, our analysis has been restricted to the case of symmetry, where
both countries apply the same type of environmental policy. Extension to the asymmetric
case where one country applies taxes and the other standards is an option. However, we do
not expect that a (complex) analysis of the asymmetric case would change our conclusion
with respect to strategic behaviour.
20
A Details of the algorithm
In this appendix details are given about the 2nd and 3rd step of the algorithm in the main
text.
Step 2: A second order Taylor approximation of the objective function of the differential








where Q is a symmetric matrix [
Q1 Q3
Q3 Q2
], q is a column vector (q1; q2), q0 is a scalar
and K is a column vector (K1;K2). The Qi denote the second derivatives of profits to
capital, respectively Q1 = iii, Q2 = 
i










For a linear-quadratic objective function, the analytical expression of the steady state can
be computed. A model with Q2 = 0, Q1 =  2, Q3 =  1, q2 = 0 and q1 = a > 0, has
been solved by Reynolds (1987) and by Fershtman and De Zeeuw (1992). Below, the
approach of the latter paper is followed to obtain a solution to the approximated game.
Consider the differential game with i given by (A.1) as the objective function.
This is a game with a quadratic objective function, linear dynamics and two state variables.
The dynamic-programming approach is used to find a linear Markov-perfect equilibrium.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for the game are:








K tQK + qtK + q0 +
@V i
@K i
(I i   dK i) + @V
i
@Kj
(Ij   dKj)g (A.2)








K tPK + ptK + p0 (A.3)
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5, p a columm-vector (p4; p5) and p0 a scalar. The











j + p5 (A.5)






j + p4) (A.6)
Because of symmetry, it suffices to consider the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation of
only one firm. For the other firm the computations are analogous. Insert the optimal
solution for investment, given by (A.6), and the value function (A.3), with derivatives
(A.4) and (A.5), into equation (A.2) and note that it must hold for each K. Equations
for the elements of P and p result if the coefficients of the quadratic expression in K are
equated to zero:
P 21 + 2P
2
3   (2d + r)cP1 +Q1c = 0 (A.7)
P 23 + 2P1P2   (2d + r)cP2 +Q2c = 0 (A.8)
2P3P1 + P3P2   (2d + r)cP3 +Q3c = 0 (A.9)
P1p4 + P3p4 + P3p5   c(d+ r)p4 + q1c = 0 (A.10)
P3p4 + P2p4 + P1p5   c(d+ r)p5 + q2c = 0 (A.11)
p24 + 2p4p5   2cq0   2crp0 = 0 (A.12)
If the investments strategies (A.6) must also result in a stable capital growth path, two
stability conditions follow from solving for (18) and (19) with (A.6):
P1 + P3   dc < 0 (A.13)
P1   P3   dc < 0 (A.14)
22
The first three equations, (A.7) to (A.9), form an independent system of equations in P1,
P2 and P3. These equations define conic sections in the (P1; P3)-plane, respectively an
ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola. This suggests to apply polar coordinates. First note that
the ellipse has its centre at (1
2




; 0) and the




P2; 0). With the transformation p1 = P1  12(2d+r)c
and p3 =
p




















(2d+ r)2c2  Q1c (A.18)
Equation (A.15) defines a circle with radius  and centre at the origin. The polar coor-
dinates R and  are introduced in the (p1; p3) plane (with origin (12(2d + r)c; 0) in the
(P1; P3) plane):
p1 = R sin  (A.19)
p3 = R cos  (A.20)










with   <  < . The P2 axis is left unchanged.
From equation (A.15) it follows that
R2 = 2: (A.23)











Now insert (A.23), (A.19) and (A.20) in (A.24). Divide by cos  and realize that sin
cos
=
tan  and that cos2  = 1
tan2 +1
. After multiplication with (1 + tan2 ) and division by
 4
p












) = 0 (A.25)









2, this can be rewritten as:
y3 + ( u+ v)y2 + y + (1
8
u+ v) = 0 (A.26)
This is a third degree polynomial. Its roots, y1, y2 and y3 might be real or complex,




























































0 <    (A.33)
Stable solutions for the feedback equilibrium are obtained from roots that after the
appropriate transformations3 result in P1, P2 and P3 that satisfy the stability requirements





2 cos ] <  1
2
rc (A.34)






2 cos ] <  1
2
rc: (A.35)
These can only be satisfied simultaneously by   <  < 0. Therefore, the interval


























Note that 42   r2c2 > 0 Let b1, b2, respectively b3, b4 denote the zeros of the two
polynomials in tan . It can be proved that b2 >  12
p
2 and b3 < 12
p
2. Also, if
j tan j < 1
2
p
2 then either 0 > sin    1
2
p




2 cos  sin < 0 and (A.35) cannot be satisfied. It follows that
tan  < b1 or b4 < tan  (A.38)
is a necessary condition for stability. Only yi = tan  that satisfy condition (A.38) result
in a stable solution.
If there is only one such a real root, a corresponding unique feedback equilibrium
results. If more roots satisfy the stability requirements a situation of multiple equilibria
occurs. Whether a unique root that satisfies (A.38) exists, depends on the values of Q1,
Q2 and Q3 in the objective function.
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4Q1 +Q2 = (2d + r)
2c+ 5Q3
Q1 +Q2 = (1=4)(2d + r)
2c+ 2Q3
Q1 +Q2 = (1=4)(2d + r)
2c  2Q3
In figure 5 the (Q1; Q2) plane is divided in 4 different regions defined by:
(1) Q1 +Q2 <
1
4
(2d + r)2c+ 2Q3
(2) Q1 +Q2 >
1
4




(2d+ r)2c+ 2Q3 < Q1 +Q2 <
1
4
(2d+ r)2c  2Q3 and






(2d+ r)2c+ 2Q3 < Q1 +Q2 <
1
4
(2d+ r)2c  2Q3 and
4Q1 +Q2 > (2d+ r)
2c+ 5Q3
In region (1), one real root of (A.26) that is larger than 1
2
p
2 exists. Therefore, in this
region there can be at most one stable solution. There is none if y1 < b4. In region (2),
one real root with yi <  12
p
2 exists, while other roots are not stable. Hence in this
region at most one stable root exists, but none if y2 > b1. In region (3) all roots satisfy





2 exist. When these are both larger than b4 multiple stable equilibria exist.
For any unique root ŷ that satisfies the stability criteria, we find ̂ = arctan(ŷ),
with   < ̂ < 0. Together with the value for  from equation (A.23), this results in
values for P1 and P3. Equation (A.8), or alternatively (A.9), gives P2. Finally equations
(A.10) to (A.12) determine p4, p5 and p0. From (A.6) then follow equilibrium linear
feedback investment strategies. The steady-state value of capital is found as the solution





P1 + P3  dc : (A.39)
The equilibrium path of capital becomes:






We have found an analytic solution to the problem for a Taylor approximation of
the original objective function around the point (K0;K0). The equilibrium steady-state
will be the new starting point (K0;K0) of the algorithm. This procedure is repeated until
the resulting steady state is close enough to the starting point.
B Proof of proposition 1




ij in the point
(K;K). Also note that if the root of equation (A.26), yi, is positive (negative) then,
from (A.22), P3 = 12
p
2 cos[arctan(yi)] is negative (positive).
In appendix A it is shown that for region (1) in figure 5 at most one stable root
of (A.26) exists. This region can be split up in a part with Q2 < 0 (region 1a) and one
with Q2  0 (region 1b). From the assumptions made below equation (22) follows that
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only the latter region is relevant for proposition 1. It will be shown that indeed in region
(1b) proposition 1 holds. That is, under the conditions in the proposition y1 > b4, so
that y1 satisfies the stability conditions and is positive. It follows that one unique stable
equilibrium exists.
DefineQ2 = (14(2d+ r)
2c+2Q3) Q1. Each point (Q1; Q2) in the region (1b)
can be determined by a Q1  14(2d + r)2c+ 2Q3 and an  2 [0; 1].


















(2d + r)2c  Q1)   12Q3, given the definition of Q2. The unique
solution to (A.26) in region (1) is larger than 1
2
p
2 (See appendix A). It must be the largest
root of the polynomial. If the largest root is real, it must be larger than the local minimum,




)  1. If it can be proved that m satisfies
the stability criteria, that is (see (A.38)), b4 < m, then the unique solution is always stable.
The derivative of m with respect to Q1 can be shown to be negative in the region
concerned (region 1b). For fixed , m therefore reaches its minimum value, m, in region
(1b) for Q1 = 14(2d + r)
2c+ 2Q3. It is given by (B.1) with A =  2Q3. Note that for the
root in (B.1) to be a real number, Q3 should satisfy jQ3j  14
p
6.
The derivative of b4 with respect to Q1 can be shown to be positive in the region






















with B =  1
4
r2c2   2Q3. Note that for 8Q3 <  r2c, B > 0.


















A sufficient condition for this to hold is that 2Q3 <  r2c. This concludes the proof of
proposition 1.
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C Exclusion of multiple equilibria under standards
From (22) follows that in an equilibrium (K,K), iii = (   1)p0
p
eK 2  
(4   2 + a   a)eK2 2, ijj =  a(   1)eK2 2 and iij =  a2eK2 2. Add
these together to see that
po(1   ) +
p




eK > 0 (C.1)




(2d + r)2c+ 2iij  iii: (C.2)
Condition (C.1) is satisfied if 4 > 2(1 + a) or
p
eK <  p0 (1 )4 2(1+a) . Since a  1,




p0. This requires  and e to be sufficiently
small. If (C.2) holds, region (4) is excluded.
D Sign of P1
Use definition A.21 and set P1 < 0. One finds that this requires





given that   <  < 0. If d, r and c are small enough, so that Q1 <  12(2d + r)2c, the
right-hand side of this inequality is smaller than 1
2
p
2. It follows that any stable solution
(which by necessity is characterized by j tan j > 1
2
p
2) satisfies inequality (D.1) and
hence has a negative P1.
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